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I. INTRODUCTION
New innovations that help parties find equitable settlement of disputes save
countless hours of litigation and countless dollars in legal fees and court costs. But
with these innovations come problems never before considered in our judicial system.
In Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. v. General Electric Co.,t the Sixth Circuit
faced a particular problem that has arisen in connection with a seven-year-old
innovation known as the summary jury trial. The court considered whether the
summary jury trial, a technique designed to help parties settle disputes by means of
a mock trial with an advisory jury, could be closed to the press and public under the
first amendment.
Proponents of closure argue that no public right of access attaches to this
proceeding since it produces only an advisory verdict that helps parties find a realistic
settlement agreement. 2 Settlement procedures have traditionally been closed to all but
the participants. The procedure has proven successful in simulating an actual trial
through the use of a judge or magistrate, an actual courtroom, and a jury selected
through a voir dire process.3 But the very factors that make the technique so valuable
a predictor of jury reaction justify a strong argument that the public should have
access to the proceeding, as it does in virtually all civil and criminal proceedings.
This Note examines the conflict between the public right of access to judicial
proceedings and the need for confidentiality in the summary jury trial. This Note
begins with a description of the summary jury trial, exploring why it was developed
and how it operates. Next, it traces the development of the right of access to judicial
proceedings. After examining the Sixth Circuit's opinion denying a right of access
and exploring the reasons supporting closure of summary jury trials, this Note will
argue that the proceeding should carry a qualified right of access.
II. DESCRIPTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUMMARY JURY TRIAL
In 1980, Federal District Court Judge Thomas D. Lambros was hearing cases he
believed should have been settled without going through the time and expense of
trial. 4 These cases had not settled, he felt, because the parties on both sides of each
dispute believed they could obtain a better resolution from a jury than from their
pretrial settlement negotiations. 5 He conceived the idea for a procedure that he hoped
would break the impasse:
* Prior to publication, on Feb. 21, 1989, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case sub nom.
Cincinnati Post v. General Electric Co., 1989 U.S. LEXIS 620.
1. 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988).
2. Id. at 904.
3. T. LAMBROS, THe SUMMARY JURY TRIAL 12-13 (1984).
4. Id. at iii.
5. Id.
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It occurred to me that if only the parties could gaze into a crystal ball and be able to predict,
with a reasonable amount of certainty, what a jury would do in their respective cases, the
parties and counsel would be more willing to reach a settlement rather than going through
the expense and aggravation of a full jury trial. 6
The "crystal ball" Judge Lambros proposed was a procedure in which each
party presents a capsulized version of its case to a jury that renders a nonbinding
advisory opinion.7 Lengthy evidentiary battles, motions, and the examination of
witnesses are all avoided. The proceeding usually lasts one-half to two days.8 Yet
each side has the chance to see how its case appears to a jury. Judge Lambros reports
from his experience with the technique that "[u]nreasonable demands and offers are
re-evaluated, and mutually agreeable compromises are worked out in light of the
jury's findings." 9
The procedure of a summary jury trial is similar in many ways to a normal trial.
Each side must present a trial brief and a set of proposed jury instructions.10 Six jurors
are selected in an abbreviated voir dire examination. 1I Only evidence that would be
admissible at trial may be submitted to the advisory jury. 12 In addition, the parties to
a dispute may choose to stipulate that the jury finding will be a final determination
on the merits, so that the summary jury trial is the sole proceeding that decides the
case. 13
However, the proceeding was designed as a settlement technique, not a
substitute or low-cost alternative to trial. 14 The authority relied on by federal courts
to conduct a summary jury trial is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, dealing with
pretrial conferences and management, and the court's inherent power to manage its
cases.15 In most cases, the summary jury technique is used only when other means of
settlement have failed and almost always as a means of bringing about a settlement
prior to trial. 16
M. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF AcCEss TO JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Right of Access to Criminal Proceedings
Controversy over closure of court proceedings is a relatively recent phenome-
non. One of the few older cases dealing with closure was In re Oliver,17 a 1948 case
in which the United States Supreme Court overturned a criminal contempt conviction
in part because the judge convicted the defendant in a secret session. Perhaps the
6. Id. (emphasis in original).
7. Id. at 9.
8. Id. at 10, 13-14.
9. Id. at 10.
10. Id. at 13.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 14.
13. Id. at 15.
14. Id. at 8.
15. Id. at 10-11.
16. Id. at 9-10.
17. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
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major motivation behind recent attempts to close proceedings or restrain press
coverage of them is the avoidance of "unfair and prejudicial news comment on
pending trials" in the wake of Sheppard v. Maxwell.1 8 In that case, the Court ordered
a new trial for a man convicted of murder because the judge had failed to keep the
trial process free from prejudicial publicity and disruptive influences.19 The Court in
Sheppard warned trial courts to "take strong measures" to ensure "that the accused
receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences." 20 The proceedings
could be properly insulated, the Court said, by continuing the case, transferring it to
another location, or sequestering the jury.2 1
Attempts to prevent prejudicial publicity by means of prior restraint of the
media22 or closure of the proceeding 5 have generally been rejected by the Court. An
exception was Gannett v. DePasquale,24 in which the Court relied on the sixth
amendment to deny a news organization access to a pretrial hearing on the
suppression of allegedly involuntary confessions.
The Court first recognized a first amendment right of public access to criminal
trials in the landmark case of Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia.25 The case
considered the constitutionality of a trial judge's order closing the courtroom to all
witnesses except during their testimony. 26 Defense counsel had requested the order
with no objection from the prosecutor. 27 The trial judge denied a motion by
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. to allow its reporters to attend the trial, citing concern
that publicity about the trial could infringe upon the due process rights of the
defendant. 28 On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that a criminal trial must be open
to the public "[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated in findings" by the trial
court. 29 Chief Justice Burger, writing for a plurality, ruled that "the right to attend
criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the first amendment; without the
freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for centuries, important
aspects of freedom of speech and 'of the press could be eviscerated.' "30 The first
amendment, Chief Justice Burger wrote, prohibits government "from limiting the
stock of information from which members of the public may draw.' '31 He repeated
a concept from earlier first amendment cases that "[firee speech carries with it some
freedom to listen.' '32
18. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
19. Id. at 358.
20. Id. at 362.
21. Id. at 363.
22. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
23. See infra notes 39-97 and accompanying text.
24. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
25. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
26. Id. at 560.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 561.
29. Id. at 581.
30. Id. at 580 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)).
31. Id. at 576 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 439 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
32. Id. See also Kiendienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1971); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Martin
v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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Chief Justice Burger traced the historical development of the public trial to
demonstrate its significance in the American judicial system.
In the days before the Norman Conquest, cases in England were generally brought before
moots, such as the local court of the hundred or the county court, which were attended by
the freemen of the community .... Somewhat like modem jury duty, attendance at these
early meetings was compulsory on the part of the freemen, who were called upon to render
judgment.33
The requirement of compulsory attendance was eventually dropped and juries
were selected to serve as proxies for the rest of the community.3 4 But the open nature
of trials remained "one of the essential qualities of a court of justice." Courts in
colonial America continued the English tradition of public trials, sometimes explicitly
recognizing the openness of trials as part of the written law of the colony. 36
The practice of holding open trials has continued throughout the history of this
country, Chief Justice Burger wrote, not out of mere blind adherence to tradition, but
because publicity itself plays an important role in ensuring the fairness of trials and
the administration of justice.3 7 He outlined several reasons why public trials have
become an indispensable part of our justice system. First, public access improves the
quality of the proceeding by encouraging all participants to conduct themselves fairly
and conscientiously.38 The fact that a witness's testimony will be heard by many
people and reported to others discourages perjury. 39 Public observance of the fact
finder guards against "decisions based on secret bias or partiality." 40
Second, a public trial has a cathartic effect on the community. "When a
shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public protest often
follows.... Thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic
purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion. ' 41
Watching the justice system run its course satisfies a natural desire to see justice done.
Third, openness engenders public confidence in the justice system and educates
the public about the way it operates. "The educative effect of public attendance is a
material advantage. Not only is respect for the law increased and intelligent
acquaintance acquired with the methods of government, but a strong confidence in
judicial remedies is secured which could never be inspired by a system of secrecy.' 42
Justice Brennan wrote a separate concurrence to explain his view that trials are
presumptively open because the first amendment "has a structural role to play in
securing and fostering our republican system of self-government. "43 Public access to
government proceedings furthers public debate on important issues and helps
33. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 565 (1980) (citation omitted).
34. Id. at 565, 572.
35. Id. at 567 (quoting Daubney v. Cooper, 109 Eng. Rep. 438, 440 (K.B. 1829)).
36. Id. at 567-68.
37. Id. at 569.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 569-70.
40. Id. at 569.
41. Id. at 571 (citations omitted).
42. Id. at 572 (quoting J. ViGmom, EvmEaNcE iN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 438 (Q. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976)).
43. Id. at 587 (emphasis in original).
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members of the public become better informed about those issues.44 The citizenry is
thus in a better position to govern itself. However, Justice Brennan said, "[a]nalysis
is not advanced by rhetorical statements that all information bears upon public issues;
what is crucial in individual cases is whether access to a particular government
process is important in terms of that very process." 45
In exploring whether public access is important to the judicial proceeding,
Justice Brennan reiterated the Chief Justice's discussion of the "nation's historic
distrust of secret proceedings," the administration of justice, and the interest in
maintaining public confidence. 46 In addition, Justice Brennan noted that the judi-
ciary, as one of the three branches of government, has enormous impact upon the
lawmaking process. 47 As a result, the value of what transpires in ajudicial proceeding
extends beyond the individual case. 48 He observed that the Court has repeatedly
upheld "the right to report about the administration of justice."- 49 For these reasons,
Justice Brennan found that "public access is an indispensable element of the trial
process," assuming structural importance in our system of government.50
Two years later in Globe Newspapers v. Superior Court,51 the Court went
beyond the "overriding interest" rule given in Richmond Newspapers to an even
higher standard supporting public access to criminal trials. Access could only be
denied, the Court held, when it is "shown that the denial is necessitated by a
compelling governmental interest. '52 The opinion of the Court, written by Justice
Brennan, adopted the rationale of his Richmond Newspapers concurrence that the first
amendment presumption of access is based both on a tradition that "implies the
favorable judgment of history" 53 and on the benefit that public access confers upon
the judicial system.
Since Globe Newspapers, the Court has ruled in favor of public access to
preliminary suppression hearings, 54 voir dire proceedings, 55 and other preliminary
hearings.5 6 The latest expression of the Court's standards for denying public access
came in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise 11),57 in which the
Court considered the constitutionality of an order excluding the press and public from
44.Id.
45. Id. at 589.
46. Id. at 589-97.
47. Id. at 595.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 592. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469 (1975).
50. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 597.
51. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
52. Id. at 606-07.
53. Id. at 605-06.
54. See, e.g., Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). However, it should be noted that openness in this case was
justified on a sixth amendment right to a public trial, rather than a first amendment right. Nevertheless, the Court relied
on the test articulated in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (Press-Enterprise 1) to find that a
party seeking to close a hearing must show an overriding interest.
55. See, e.g.. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (Press-Enterprise 1).
56. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press-Enterprise 11).
57. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
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a pretrial criminal proceeding and prohibiting release of the transcript from the
proceeding.
The Court in Press-Enterprise II recognized that labeling a judicial proceeding
as part of a "trial" is inadequate to explain why the event should be open to the
public.5 8 The Court added to its analysis a two-step inquiry based on Globe
Newspapers to help decide whether a particular proceeding is the type that is
presumptively open. First, has "the place and process ... historically been open to
the press and public?" 5 9 Second, does public access play "a significant role in the
functioning of the particular process in question?" 6 If both of these "tests of
experience and logic" are met, then this is the type of proceeding that is
presumptively open to the public. 61 Once this presumption is established, it may only
be overcome "by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."62
B. Right of Access to Civil Proceedings
Before considering how these precedents might affect the issue of summary jury
trial closure, it will be useful to consider whether the presumption of openness
extends to civil proceedings. Although the United States Supreme Court has never
specifically ruled on this point, lower courts have used the Court's reasoning and
dicta to find a presumption of public access to civil trials and court documents. 63 The
Court addressed this question briefly in Richmond Newspapers with its statement that
"[w]hether the public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is a question not raised
by this case, but we note that historically both civil and criminal trials have been
presumptively open.' ' 64
The trend among lower courts is to rely on Richmond Newspapers and its
progeny to find a presumption of public access in civil cases. 65 Representative of this
trend is Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C.,66 which involved a dispute
between a tobacco company and the Federal Trade Commission over the accuracy of
the Commission's testing of "tar" levels in Barclay cigarettes. 67 A consumer
organization engaging in health research filed a brief to urge that the Sixth Circuit lift
the lower court's seal on all the documents filed by the F.T.C. 68 In its decision, the
Sixth Circuit reviewed the Supreme Court's holdings on access to criminal trials and
concluded that the Court's rationales supported access to civil proceedings:
58. Id. at 7.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 9.
62. Id. at 9-10 (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)).
63. See infra notes 80-97 and accompanying text. See also Note, Public Access to Civil Court Records, 39 VA.
L. REv. 1465 (1986). See generally Note, After Richmond Newspapers: A Public Right to Attend Civil Trials?, 4
Co.tMWErN 291 (1982).
64. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980).
65. See supra note 63.
66. 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983).
67. Id. at 1168.
68. Id. at 1169.
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The policy considerations discussed in Richmond Newspapers apply to civil as well as
criminal cases. The resolution of private disputes frequently involves issues and remedies
affecting third parties or the general public. The community catharsis, which can only occur
if the public can watch and participate, is also necessary in civil cases. Civil cases frequently
involve issues crucial to the public-for example, discrimination, voting rights, antitrust
issues, government regulation, bankruptcy, etc.
The concern of Justice Brennan that secrecy eliminates one of the important checks on the
integrity of the system applies no differently in a civil setting. In either the civil or the
criminal courtroom, secrecy insulates the participants, masking impropriety, obscuring
incompetence, and concealing corruption.
Finally, the fact-finding considerations relied upon by Justice Brennan obviously apply to
civil cases. Openness in the courtroom discourages perjury and may result in witnesses
coming forward with new information regardless of the type of the proceeding. 9
The court noted that the right of access does have its limits. Courts have
restricted access to judicial proceedings to maintain order and decorum in the
courtroom7o and to protect against the disclosure of certain types of information. 7'
The latter type of limitation-content-based restrictions-has been used in some
instances to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial, preserve a party's right of
privacy, or to guard against disclosure of national security or trade secrets. 72 The
court found that the tobacco company had not shown a competing interest sufficient
to justify an exception to the right of access. 73 "Simply showing that the information
would harm the company's reputation is not sufficient to overcome the strong
common law presumption in favor of public access to court proceedings and
records." 74
In Wilson v. American Motors Corp.,75 the Eleventh Circuit dealt with issues of
special significance to the question of closing a summary jury trial, a proceeding
designed primarily as a settlement technique. The court considered whether a district
court had properly denied a request to unseal the judicial records of a prior case that
had settled out of court. 76 In the prior case, a wrongful death action arising out of a
jeep accident, American Motors negotiated a seal upon the record as part of the
settlement agreement. 77 The prior case was settled "with the 'encouragement and
assistance' of the trial judge" after a jury responded to special interrogatories. 78 The
appellant in the instant case sought the records to invoke offensive collateral estoppel
against American Motors in another wrongful death suit.79
The court declined to follow the Sixth Circuit's standard that virtually the only
69. Id. at 1179.
70. Id. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
71. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983). See Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978); Note, Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment Right of Public Access to
Judicial Proceedings, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1899 (1978).
72. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d at 1179.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 759 F.2d 1568 (1Ith Cir. 1985).
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interests sufficient to justify closure are a right of privacy, a defendant's right to a fair
trial, trade secrets, and national security.80 Instead, the court adopted a standard
based on Globe Newspapers set forth in an earlier case dealing with the openness of
civil trials:
We do not hold that every hearing, deposition, conference or even trial in a case of this kind
must be open to the public. We do hold that "where, as in the present case, the [court]
attempts to deny access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must be
shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly
tailored to that interest."
8
'
The court found that "the interest in preserving the authority of the court in
assisting in settlement agreements does not override the presumption of openness in
civil proceedings." 82 The interests of the public must be given great weight because
access helps ensure the "integrity of the system" and allows the public to understand
the significant issues dealt with in civil litigation. 83
IV. DENYING THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO SuMMARY JURY TRIALs-THE GEERAL
ELEcTRIc CASE
Should the right of access to judicial proceedings developed by the Supreme
Court in the criminal context, and applied by most circuits in the civil context, extend
to the summary jury trial? This is the central question raised by Cincinnati Gas &
Electric Co. v. General Electric Co.84
A. Background
The case involved a suit brought in federal district court by the owners of a failed
nuclear power project against General Electric Co. (GE), alleging that GE covered up
flaws in a nuclear reactor system it sold to the owners of the project.8 5 Plaintiffs
alleged $360 million in damages as a result of the reactor's flaws. 86
The alleged flaws in the reactor system were but one part of a highly publicized
debacle involving the Zimmer nuclear power project. Cost overruns, charges of
corruption in the construction and inspection of the plant, and problems in the reactor
all contributed to the eventual abandonment of the site as a nuclear power plant.8 7 The
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, citing negligence and mismanagement on the
part of the three utilities that owned the project, denied those utilities the right to pass
the project losses on to consumers.8 8 The heightened interest of the public in the
80. Id. at 1570-71.
81. Id. at 1571 (quoting Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 802 (11th Cir. 1983)).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988).
85. Columbus Dispatch, Sept. 16, 1987, at 7E, col. 2.
86. Id.
87. Grieves, A $1.6 Billion Nuclear Fiasco, Tim, Oct. 31, 1983, at 96.
88. 71 P.U.R.4th 140, 153 (1985).
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Zimmer project prompted several newspapers that had covered the project to
intervene in the lawsuit to contest a June 1987 closure order.8 9
Judge S. Arthur Spiegel denied the newspapers' motion, but ordered that a
transcript be made of the summary jury trial to preserve the substance of the
proceeding in case his decision was overturned on appeal. 9° Judge Spiegel cited
"General Electric's concerns regarding this procedure" as the reason for the closure
order.91 A protective order negotiated by the parties and approved by the magistrate
protected much of the material that would be produced in discovery. 92
B. Sixth Circuit's Decision and Rationale
In upholding the closure order, the Sixth Circuit relied on the test articulated by
the Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise 1H.93 The court addressed the first prong of
that test-whether there has been a "tradition of accessibility"-by agreeing with
Judge Spiegel that "there is no historically recognized right of access to summary
jury trials in that this mechanism has been in existence for less than a decade. "94 The
court rejected the suggestion of the appellants that the mechanism's similarity to a
trial required a finding of traditional access, ruling instead that the mechanism is a
settlement technique historically closed to the press and public:
At every turn the summary jury trial is designed to facilitate pretrial settlement of the
litigation, much like a settlement conference. It is important to note that the summary jury
trial does not present any matter for adjudication by the court. Thus, we find appellants'
argument to be unpersuasive and therefore hold that the "tradition of accessibility" element
has not been met. 95
The court also found that the second prong of the Press-Enterprise 11
test-whether access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the
particular process in question-had not been met.96 Public access, the court believed,
would actually be detrimental to a process in which one of the parties has concerns
about confidentiality, and would diminish the technique's effectiveness as a settle-
ment device. 97 "Therefore, allowing access would undermine the substantial
governmental interest in promoting settlements, and would not play a 'significant
positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.' "98 The court
decided that because the Press-Enterprise II test had not been met, no right of access
attached to the summary jury trial proceeding. 99
89. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 117 F.R.D. 597, 598 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd, 854 F.2d 900
(6th Cir. 1988).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 600.
92. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 901 (6th Cir. 1988).
93. Id. at 903-05.
94. Id. at 903 (quoting Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 117 F.R.D. 598, 599 (S.D. Ohio 1987),
aft'd, 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988)).
95. Id. at 904.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. (quoting Press-Enterprise H, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)).
99. Id. at 905.
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As previously noted, the ambiguity over whether a summary jury trial falls under
the "trial" category or the "settlement" category is one of the key issues in deciding
the question of access. The Sixth Circuit resolved this issue by drawing a distinction
based on whether a court is exercising its "coercive powers."' 100 The court explained
that Press-Enterprise H involved a judicial proceeding that "resulted in a binding
judicial determination which directly affected the rights of the parties."' But the
summary jury trial, like a settlement negotiation or status conference, usually
presents no issue for final and binding adjudication.1 02 "Thus, it is the presence of
the exercise of a court's coercive powers that is the touchstone of the recognized right
of access, not the presence of a procedure that might lead the parties to voluntarily
terminate the litigation." 103 This distinction gave further support to the court's
conclusion that public access is unnecessary at a summary jury trial.
Judge Edwards concurred with the court's ruling that the summary jury trial
could properly be conducted without public access, but argued that the transcript
should be released once the dispute has settled. 1 4 "I recognize that the view
expressed above might impede some settlements, but I cannot reconcile complete
suppression of this record with the First Amendment which our forefathers placed as
the first condition for the founding of our nation." 05
C. Other Considerations Supporting Closure
In many ways, the case for protecting a summary jury trial from public scrutiny
is compelling. When a judge is considering holding a summary jury trial, it is
generally because she feels the parties cannot settle the case due to differences over
an appropriate settlement amount, or over the way the case will be seen by a jury. The
summary jury trial offers an effective method of overcoming this deadlock by
showing the parties how a jury views the case without subjecting either side to the risk
of a binding defeat.
If a party refuses to participate in the summary jury trial out of concern that
public disclosure of some matters might be harmful or embarrassing, and the judge
cannot hold the proceedings in private, a promising means of settling the case is lost.
The case then proceeds to further negotiations or, more likely, to a full-length trial at
great cost to the public.
Choosing between the competing interests of ensuring public access to judicial
proceedings and encouraging settlement of cases, the Sixth Circuit settled the matter
by declaring that the summary jury trial should properly be considered a form of
settlement negotiation for the purposes of public access.106 As the court points out,
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Although the parties may stipulate that the finding of the jury will be binding, the parties in the General Electric
case chose not to do that. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. (Edwards, J., concurring).




the technique differs from a normal trial in many ways. Rather than binding the
parties as a trial on the merits, the technique leads only to an advisory opinion that
helps the parties evaluate their respective settlement positions. 07 Courts find
authority for conducting this procedure under the judicial rule of pretrial
management.108 The procedure is conducted only with the cooperation of both
parties.t°9 The proceeding is short compared to a full trial, with no live testimony, no
cross-examination, and no formal introduction of evidence. 110 Finally, if the parties
fail to settle, the outcome of the summary jury trial has no bearing on the merits or
ultimate outcome of the case."'
Seen this way, the summary jury trial is akin to a settlement negotiation or the
discovery process-both of which enjoy special protection from disclosure. On the
matter of discovery, the Supreme Court has spoken clearly in Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart.1t2 Ruling that a litigant newspaper had no constitutional right to publish
information learned during discovery, the Court held that pretrial proceedings are not
a traditionally public source of information." 3 When a protective order limiting
dissemination of material learned in pretrial proceedings "furthers a substantial
government interest unrelated to the suppression of expression," the order does not
violate the first amendment.114 Such an order furthers the government interest in
encouraging settlement of lawsuits.
Indeed, the state interest in promoting settlement is the chief policy reason
supporting closure of the summary jury trial. Full litigation of an issue in court can
be extremely expensive for the parties to the dispute and for the public treasury." 5
The number of cases pending before American courts continues to increase."16 The
resulting backlog leads to delays in the justice system for all participants. These
problems can be reduced when parties agree to settle their cases out of court.' '7 To
the extent public access to a summary jury trial serves as an impediment to the
settlement process, it works against efforts to alleviate a backlogged justice system.
Public access may work against the summary jury trial process in a number of
ways. The process depends on a certain degree of candor and informality from the
107. See T. LAMBROS, supra note 3, at 9.
108. Id. at 10-11.
109. Id. at 10.
110. Id. at 10, 13-14.
111. Id. at 10.
112. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
113. Id. at 33.
114. Id. at 34, 37.
115. J. Corm, J. FRimEtmIAL, A. MnLLER & J. S-xroN, Cim PRocE uRE 1150-51 (1985).
116. At the federal level, for example, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court
reports:
During 1987, the federal judiciary at every level disposed of cases at or near record levels. The Supreme Court
acted upon 4,340 cases; the courts of appeals 36,010 cases; the district courts 238,000 civil and 41,087 criminal
cases. In addition, bankruptcy judges and magistrates disposed of a large volume of cases and contested matters,
many of which would have otherwise required the attention of a district judge. But, despite the determined
efforts of everyone associated with the federal judiciary, both new filings and pending cases continue at high
and in some instances record levels.
Unfortunately, there is a good likelihood that our workload will become even heavier.
REHmQUiST, 1987 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY 4 (1987).
117. See generally Sander, Varieties of Dispute Process, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976).
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participants"1 8 Public scrutiny may discourage parties from being candid and
forthright about their evidence without the usual procedural safeguards found in a
normal trial. A lack of confidentiality in the proceeding may destroy the atmosphere
vital to the success of the summary jury trial, or discourage parties from participating
at all. " 9 Thus, reflexively labeling the technique as a judicial proceeding presump-
tively open to the public may limit the usefulness of an innovative technique designed
to help parties settle their cases and reduce overcrowded dockets.
In addition, public access may add little value to the summary jury trial. A jury
made up of citizens from the community observes the process, thereby providing the
element of public scrutiny that the Supreme Court has deemed so vital to maintaining
the integrity of the justice system. 120 And while some argue that the public will miss
the opportunity to hear the issues involved in the case if the proceeding is closed,12 1
others point out that this always happens when parties settle their disputes out of
court. 122
V. RECOMMENDED ANALYSIS
A. Settlement Negotiations or Trial?
Given these compelling reasons, is the Sixth Circuit correct in declaring the
summary jury trial closed to the public as merely an innovative form of settlement
negotiations? Or does the summary jury trial carry so many attributes of a normal trial
that it should be open to the public in the way trials historically have been?
The four Ohio newspapers that intervened to contest the closure order argued
that a summary jury trial bears too much resemblance to a trial to be considered
simply another settlement technique.123 For example, a judge paid from tax dollars
presides over the proceeding, and a jury of citizens listens to the case and renders a
verdict. 124 In addition, the proceeding serves as a forum for discussion of legal issues
and, in this case, matters of paramount public concern. 25 The newspapers contrasted
the summary jury trial with the typical settlement conference to show that the
proceeding has more in common with a regular trial. 126 They also noted that the
proceeding occurred after the final pretrial conference with the judge. 127 For these
reasons, they argued, a summary jury trial is essentially a trial procedure, and such
procedures have historically been open to the press and public. 128
The General Electric court articulated a number of reasons why the summary
118. Rieders, Summary Jury Trials, 23 TRIAL 93, 93-94 (1987).
119. Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987).
120. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 117 F.R.D. 597, 602 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd, 854 F.2d 900
(6th Cir. 1988).
121. Id. at 601.
122. Id.
123. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 902 (6th Cir. 1988).
124. See T. LAMBROS, supra note 3, at 13.
125. General Electric, 117 F.R.D. at 600.
126. Id. at 601.
127. Id. at 601-02.
128. Id. at 600.
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jury trial should be considered a settlement proceeding. These reasons centered
primarily on the purpose for which the summary jury trial exists. 129 One of the main
arguments was that the first amendment mandates public access only when a court
exercises "coercive powers." 130 While this argument makes a rational distinction
between the summary jury proceeding and a normal trial, it does little to explain why
public access is unnecessary at a proceeding that bears some resemblance to trial and
usually has enormous impact on settlement negotiations. The mere fact that a court
has made no binding adjudication is not a sufficient reason to remove the entire
proceeding from public view. For example, in Wilson, the Eleventh Circuit upheld
the right of access to affidavits, depositions, trial transcripts, and other records of a
case that had settled before a binding decision had been made. 131
The court never explains why the use of coercive powers, and not some other
factor, should be decisive in resolving the question of public access. Like other
arguments for declaring that the summary jury trial is nothing more than settlement
negotiations, the "coercive powers" argument amounts to mere labeling.
Simply labeling the summary jury trial either a settlement proceeding or a trial
proves to be of little help in resolving the question of access. The Supreme Court
recognized in Press-Enterprise II that "the First Amendment question cannot be
resolved solely on the label we give the event, i.e. 'trial' or otherwise, particularly
where the preliminary hearing functions much like a full scale trial."132 As Judge
Edwards pointed out in General Electric, the summary jury trial "resemble[s] both
settlement negotiations and a bench trial.' 1 33 Its ambiguous nature makes it
inappropriate to categorize the technique without explaining fully why it should be
judged by one standard and not another.
The Supreme Court began to encounter this difficulty in a number of cases
following Richmond Newspapers. 134 Other courts were unsure whether such proceed-
ings as voir dire, a suppression hearing, or a preliminary hearing had a history of
openness and were presumptively open to the public. 35 The Court responded by
requiring in its analysis not only the question of whether the process had been
historically open, but also "whether public access plays a significant positive role in
the functioning of the particular process in question."' 136 By requiring that a
proceeding must pass the tests of both "experience and logic" before any right of
access would attach,137 the Court demanded an inquiry into the nature of the
proceeding to identify specifically whether access would serve a helpful purpose in
the proceeding.
Such an inquiry, using the Supreme Court's Press-Enterprise II analysis, is the
129. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 903-04 (6th Cir. 1988).
130. Id. at 905.
131. Wilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1571 (11th Cir. 1985).
132, Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986).
133. General Electric, 854 F.2d at 905 (Edwards, J., concurring).
134, See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
136. Press-Enterprise 11, 478 U.S. at 8.
137. Id. at 9.
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best way to resolve the question of how to treat the ambiguous summary jury trial.
A Press-Enterprise II analysis that closely follows the Supreme Court's reasoning in
public access cases will demonstrate why summary jury trials should be presump-
tively open to the press and public.
B. Press-Enterprise II Analysis
1. History of Access
In finding that the summary jury trial procedure failed the "history of access"
prong, the Sixth Circuit made the argument that the procedure was designed as a
settlement technique and that settlement negotiations are traditionally closed
procedures.1 38 But since the summary jury trial has characteristics of both pretrial
settlement procedures and a full trial, the assumption that it falls into the category of
settlement seems an inappropriate way to settle the "history of access" question.
While the court is correct that the summary jury trial was originally designed as
a settlement technique, the way it operates has in many ways overstepped the
boundaries of settlement negotiations. The procedure intentionally adopts many of
the attributes of a full civil trial to make the procedures more realistic. With those
realistic qualities comes the reality that, in the long run, the integrity and fairness of
the proceeding depends in part on public access and scrutiny.
The other historical argument was that the summary jury trial has been a closed
procedure for its entire, though short, history. 139 This argument entirely lacks merit.
It is a surprising result that judges could invent and begin using a new procedure,
declare it closed to the public from the beginning, and upon challenge to the closed
proceeding respond that closure is appropriate because "it has always been this
way." Perhaps the best that can be said on the matter of history is that the summary
jury trial shares many of the characteristics of an actual trial, but no conclusive
answer exists about whether tradition mandates an open or closed proceeding.
Another factor of note is the Supreme Court's broad language in applying the
Press-Enterprise II test to judicial "proceedings. ' 140 In the lower court, Judge
Spiegel argued that the right of access does not apply to a summary jury trial because
it is not a full "trial. ' 14 1 The Court's language indicates that the standard applies not
just to trials, but to all "proceedings."
2. Access Plays a Significant Positive Role
The crucial test is the second prong of the Press-Enterprise II test, which was
added by the Court precisely to deal with the problem of proceedings to which access
could not be adequately resolved on the basis of history. This prong requires an
138. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 903-04 (6th Cir. 1988).
139. Id. at 903.
140. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 7.
141. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 117 F.R.D. 597, 600-02 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd, 854 F.2d
900 (6th Cir. 1988).
1466 [Vol. 49:1453
SUMMARY JURY TRIALS
inquiry into whether access will play a significant positive role in the proceeding. 142
The Sixth Circuit's argument for closure was that since access to the summary jury
trial would hinder the state interest in promoting settlement, it is therefore not the type
of proceeding for which public access would play a significant positive role. 143 This
argument misconstrues the Supreme Court's formulation of this test.
The Court has explained the second prong of the test by contrasting most
government procedures with those for which access would totally frustrate the
purpose. 144 Examples of the latter category could include a grand jury proceeding' 45
and a high-level national security meeting.146 Into this category fall those proceedings
that by their very nature demand secrecy. The summary jury trial is not the type of
proceeding that by its very nature must be kept secret in all cases. Thus, it should fall
into the first category-that of the normal government proceeding.
In considering whether a proceeding meets the second prong-that access plays
a significant positive role-the Court has always explored whether the proceeding
would benefit from public access and whether the public would benefit from access
to the proceeding. 147 While it is possible that secrecy would encourage some parties
to engage in summary jury trials and might allow for a more candid atmosphere,
secrecy plays no vital role in the proceeding the way it does for a grand jury. On the
contrary, the summary jury trial could benefit from openness the way most judicial
proceedings do. It would promote "true and accurate fact finding" 148 in a proceeding
that could have great impact on the outcome of many disputes. It would help maintain
fairness and impartiality among the judges who preside over the proceedings and the
juries that decide them. Counsel for both sides would be less likely to misrepresent
or exaggerate the evidence because of the increased possibility of contradiction.
Witnesses or others with pertinent information may hear of the dispute and come
forward to offer it. Contrary to the assertion of Judge Spiegel, 149 the presence of a
small jury would clearly be inadequate for this purpose.
In many cases, discussion of the issues in public would serve the public interest.
The General Electric case provides a clear example of a summary jury trial that deals
with matters of vital concern to the public. A discussion of charges that a well-known
company delivered a flawed reactor system to be used in a nuclear power plant could
shed new light on the controversial topic of nuclear power. Even Judge Spiegel, while
feeling constrained for other reasons to uphold the closure order, agreed with the
newspapers that openness would serve the public interest:
We are in complete agreement with movants that the issues central to the merits of this
case present matters of paramount public concern. And, as an aside, we note that were the
142. Press-Enterprise 11, 478 U.S. at 8.
143. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 904 (6th Cir. 1988).
144. Press-Enterprise 11, 478 U.S. at 9.
145. Id.
146. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 598 n.24 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring).
147. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise 11, 478 U.S. at 10-13.
148. Globe Newspapers v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
149. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 117 F.R.D. 597, 602 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd, 854 F.2d 900
(6th Cir. 1988)..
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matter one purely within the Court's discretion, we would advocate opening the procedure
to the press and public, in the belief that all parties, as well as the public, would be
well-served by an airing of the issues. 150
Finally, it should be noted that the use of the summary jury trial and other forms
of alternative dispute resolution continues to grow.1 51 These techniques for settling
disputes work well in some situations and avoid much of the time, expense, and risk
of trial. 152 A continued increase in the use of summary jury trials would mean that an
ever larger percentage of cases would be resolved this way, rather than through trials.
Courts will have to consider whether it is desirable for a whole field of judicial
proceedings to be off limits to public view. Although the closure of summary jury
trials may have little impact on the integrity of the court system now, while the
number of such proceedings is few, closure of a significant portion of judicial
proceedings in the future would likely have a negative impact on the system.
C. Summary Jury Trials Should Carry a Qualified Right of Access
Under the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in General Electric, the summary jury trial
carries no presumption of access at all. 153 The court decided that no greater right of
access attaches to the summary jury trial than attaches to a settlement conference held
in a private law office. 154 It follows that even if neither party has any reason to want
protection from public scrutiny, the proceeding may still be closed to the press and
public even though it is held in a public courtroom, presided over by a judge working
for the government, and viewed by an empaneled jury paid with tax dollars. The
Sixth Circuit's protection of the summary jury trial, though done for the best of
reasons, clearly goes too far.
For the reasons stated earlier, the summary jury trial procedure should be
declared presumptively open to public scrutiny. However, as the Supreme Court has
recognized repeatedly, the right of access to judicial proceedings is not absolute.1 55
Valid reasons may exist to close summary jury trials to public scrutiny in certain
cases. If so, the Court has provided the appropriate standard:
[Tihe presumption may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that
closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court
can determine whether the closure order was properly entered. 156
In General Electric, the Sixth Circuit should have recognized the presumptive
openness of the summary jury trial and then used the above standard to decide if the
protection of GE's "concerns" was an interest of sufficient magnitude to overcome
150. Id. at 600.
151. See Lambros, The Alternative Movement: Rekindling America's Creative Spirit, I Olo ST. J. DIs. REs. 3
(1985).
152. Id.
153. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 903 (6th Cir. 1988).
154. Id.
155. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986).
156. Id. at 9.
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the many reasons for openness. There is no way to know from these judicial opinions
just what GE's concerns were. But if they amounted merely to a concern for
protecting GE from some embarrassment, this should not be enough to overcome the
presumption of access, as the Sixth Circuit has previously ruled. 5 7
VI. CONCLUSION
Although there are a number of reasons for allowing summary jury trials to be
closed to the public, the value of public access demands that the procedure be
presumptively open to the press and public, as are most criminal and civil
proceedings. Were a party to point out special circumstances and move for closure,
a court could close the proceeding, but only in an extraordinary case. The moving
party would need to show an "overriding interest" such that "closure is essential to
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." 158 This
approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in cases dealing with
access to judicial proceedings.
While public access may limit the use of the summary jury trial to some extent,
forcing parties to settle the dispute another way or go to trial, that situation is
preferable to shutting off an increasing number of judicial proceedings from public
view.
Andrew G. Sykes
157. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983).
158. Id.
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